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Coevolving and competing species or game-theoretic strategies exhibit rich and complex dynamics for
which a general theoretical framework based on finite populations is still lacking. Recently, an explicit mean-
field description in the form of a Fokker-Planck equation was derived for frequency-dependent selection with
two strategies in finite populations based on microscopic processes A. Traulsen, J. C. Claussen, and C. Hauert,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 238701 2005. Here we generalize this approach in a twofold way: First, we extend the
framework to an arbitrary number of strategies and second, we allow for mutations in the evolutionary process.
The deterministic limit of infinite population size of the frequency-dependent Moran process yields the ad-
justed replicator-mutator equation, which describes the combined effect of selection and mutation. For finite
populations, we provide an extension taking random drift into account. In the limit of neutral selection, i.e.,
whenever the process is determined by random drift and mutations, the stationary strategy distribution is
derived. This distribution forms the background for the coevolutionary process. In particular, a critical mutation
rate uc is obtained separating two scenarios: above uc the population predominantly consists of a mixture of
strategies whereas below uc the population tends to be in homogeneous states. For one of the fundamental
problems in evolutionary biology, the evolution of cooperation under Darwinian selection, we demonstrate that
the analytical framework provides excellent approximations to individual based simulations even for rather
small population sizes. This approach complements simulation results and provides a deeper, systematic un-
derstanding of coevolutionary dynamics.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.74.011901 PACS numbers: 87.23.n, 89.65.s, 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
Darwinian evolution incorporates three basic processes:
mutation, selection, and random drift. In evolving popula-
tions mutations create variation, which produce fitness dif-
ferences for selection to act upon and random drift accounts
for stochastic effects arising due to the finite size of the
population. The consideration of finite populations has a long
tradition in population genetics 1–4 with frequency-
independent selection. Often, finite size effects can be
viewed as corrections to a continuum theory based on an
infinite population 5,6. Here, we analyze such finite popu-
lation effects for frequency-dependent selection. Under
frequency-dependent selection, or coevolutionary dynamics,
the fitness of each individual is affected by interactions with
other members of the population. The corresponding math-
ematical framework is evolutionary game theory 7,8. In the
absence of mutations and in the deterministic limit of large
well-mixed populations where individuals interact randomly,
the replicator equation 9,10 describes the change in fre-
quency of the different strategic types in the population. In-
cluding mutations in this limit leads to the replicator-mutator
equation 11,12. Interestingly, results can be quite different
when turning to coevolutionary processes in finite popula-
tions based on the Moran process 3,13,14. The frequency-
dependent Moran process is a stochastic birth-death process
where an individual is randomly selected for reproduction
with a probability proportional to its fitness. The clonal off-
spring then replaces a randomly chosen individual in the
population such that the population size remains constant. If
there are only two types of individuals in the population, the
evolutionary process can be mapped onto a random walk in
one dimension 15. For more than two types the dynamics
becomes significantly more difficult 16. Further complica-
tions arise when individuals no longer interact randomly but,
instead, spatial structure leads to limited local interactions.
Traditionally, this is modeled by arranging individuals on a
spatial lattice 17–19 or on more general networks 20–25
and leads to new phenomena, which includes critical phase
transitions 26, and can affect the evolutionary process even
in frequency-independent settings 27,28.
For two strategic types in well-mixed populations we es-
tablished an explicit connection between microscopic sto-
chastic processes in finite populations and the deterministic
limit of infinite populations 29. The finite size effects are
captured in the drift and diffusion terms of a Fokker-Planck
equation where the diffusion term vanishes with 1/N for
increasing population sizes. In the present paper the Fokker-
Planck equation is generalized to an arbitrary number of
strategies as well as to cover mutational changes of the
strategic type.
In Sec. II the frequency-dependent Moran process is gen-
eralized to d strategies including mutations. The derivation
of the corresponding Fokker-Planck equation is recalled in
Sec. III and the stationary distribution is derived in Sec. IV.
This covers frequency-independent and frequency-dependent
selections. As applications, we consider the Prisoner’s Di-
lemma and the Snowdrift game. The relation to dynamics in
infinite populations is derived in Sec. V. An example for an
alternative microscopic process is provided in Sec. VI.
II. GENERALIZED MORAN PROCESS
The frequency-dependent Moran process has been intro-
duced as a stochastic process among two types 13. Al-
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though the extension to more strategies is straightforward
16, the dynamics becomes significantly more difficult. In
complete analogy to the Moran process among two individu-
als, an individual is chosen at random proportional to fitness
in every time step. This individual produces offspring which
replaces a randomly chosen individual. In addition to the
original frequency-dependent Moran process, we include
mutations, i.e., an individual of type k produces offspring of
type j with probabiliy qjk, where  j=1d qjk=1 and d is the
number of different types in the population. The special case
of vanishing mutations is recovered by setting qjk= jk. Note
that there are no restrictions on the frequency of mutations or
on the states in which mutations occur. For d2, the state
space of the system is no longer a simple one-dimensional
chain, but the discretized simplex Sd
N
= i1 , . . . , id
N0
d : j=1
d ij =N, where ij is the number of individuals of
type j and N is the total size of the population. The fitness  j
of an individual of type j is a linear combination of the
payoff from interactions given by the entries of the dd
payoff matrix M with elements mjk and a baseline fitness,
which is set to one for convenience. Hence,
 ji1, . . . ,id = 1 − w + w
1
N − 1

k=1
d
mjkik − mjj , 1
where self interactions are excluded by subtracting the pay-
off mjj. The selection intensity w determines the relative con-
tributions of the baseline fitness and the interactions to the
total fitness of an individual. For w→0 selection is weak and
payoffs from the game represent small perturbations to the
constant background fitness. For strong selection w→1, the
influence of the background fitness vanishes and fitness is
determined entirely by interactions. Since individuals are se-
lected proportional to fitness, the fitness has to be a positive
number. This can be guaranteed by payoff matrices with
positive entries only, mjk0 for all j and k, or by a suffi-
ciently small w.
Based on this fitness definition, the probability Tkj that an
individual of type k is replaced by an individual of type j can
be calculated. Tkj is the product of the probability that the
individual chosen at random for elimination is of type k and
the probability that an offspring of type j is produced. There
are two possibilities to produce such an offspring: An indi-
vidual of type j is chosen for reproduction with probability
ij j / N, where =m=1
d mim /N, is the average payoff in
the population. It produces identical offspring with probabil-
ity qjj. The second possibility is that an individual of type l
produces an offspring of type j due to mutations with prob-
ability qlj. Hence, the probability Tkj is given by
Tkji1, . . . ,id =
1
Nl=1
d
illi1, . . . ,idqlj
ik
N
. 2
These transition probabilities describe the effect of selection
and mutation in finite populations. The probabilistic nature
of this coevolutionary process accounts for random drift.
Since the state space of this system is no longer a one-
dimensional chain for d2, many standard methods can no
longer be applied. However, as in the case d=2 a Fokker-
Planck equation for the dynamics of the system can be de-
rived for large populations.
Although we are motivated by the generalized frequency
dependent Moran process, the calculations following in Secs.
III and IV are valid in a more general sense. In particular,
they apply to any coevolutionary birth death process, such as
the local update rule discussed in Ref. 29, see Sec. VI.
III. FOKKER-PLANCK EQUATION
In analogy to Ref. 29 for d=2, a general Fokker-Planck
equation for the probability density of strategies x in an
evolutionary game among d types can be derived. The con-
stant population size of the generalized Moran process leads
to a normalization of x,  j=1
d xj =1. Thus, we have d−1 inde-
pendent variables. As shown in the Appendix, a Kramers-
Moyal expansion yields the Fokker-Planck equation:
˙x = − 
k=1
d−1

xk
xakx +
1
2 j,k=1
d−1
2
xkxj
xbjkx , 3
where x= x1 , . . . ,xd with xj = ij /N. The drift coefficients are
given by
akx = 
j=1
d
Tjkx − Tkjx 4
and can be interpreted as an effective flow into state k: The
first term is the probability that the number of k individuals
increases, whereas the second term describes the probability
for transitions from k to other states. For the diffusion ma-
trix, we find
bjkx =
1
N− Tjkx − Tkjx +  jkl=1
d
Tjlx + Tljx	 .
5
For two types, d=2, and without mutations, the Fokker-
Planck equation from Ref. 29 is recovered. Equation 3
describes the dynamics on the basis of changes in the prob-
ability distribution. Traditionally, coevolutionary systems are
often described by considering dynamical equations for the
state of the system. General conclusions are then based on
averages made over several realizations of the process. Here,
the correspondence between both descriptions becomes clear,
since the Fokker-Planck Eq. 3 corresponds to a stochastic
differential equation 30–32. The noise arises only from sto-
chastic updating and is therefore not correlated in time.
Hence, the Itô calculus can be applied to derive a Langevin
equation describing the development of x. Equation 3 cor-
responds to the stochastic replicator-mutator equation
x˙k = akx + 
j=1
d−1
ckjx	 jt , 6
where ckj is defined by l=1
d−1cklxcljx=bkjx. Each element
of the vector  is Gaussian white noise with unit variance.
The different elements are uncorrelated,

	kt	 js=kjt−s. Equation 6 allows us to approxi-
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mate fluctuations arising from finite populations by Langevin
terms that appear in a replicator equation. For any given
payoff matrix, selection pressure, population size, and muta-
tion rate, it provides a quantitative description of the fluctua-
tions introduced by stochastic microscopic update processes.
IV. STATIONARY DISTRIBUTION
The stationary distribution of strategies *x can be de-
rived from the Fokker-Planck Eq. 3, which can be written
in the form
˙x = − Jx , 7
where the d−1 elements of the probability current Jx are
Jkx = xakx −
1
2j=1
d−1

xj
xbjkx . 8
In general, the stationary solution ˙x=0 is equivalent to a
probability current without sources. A special case of this is a
probability current vanishing everywhere, i.e., Jkx=0 for
all x. This leads to

k=1
d−1
bjkx

xk
*x = *x2ajx − 
k=1
d−1

xk
bjkx	 . 9
If we exclude the degenerate cases with det bjkx=0, the
matrix bjkx can be inverted and Eq. 9 reduces to

xi
ln *x = 
j=1
d−1
bij
−1x2ajx − 
k=1
d−1

xk
bjkx	 = 
ix .
10
A solution of this equation only exists if 
x is a gradient
30,32. In that case, the stationary solution of Eq. 3 can be
obtained from a line integral between x0 and x which is
independent of the path
*x = N exp
x0
x
y · dy	 , 11
where N is a normalization constant. However, in coevolu-
tionary systems the requirement that x is a gradient is
often not fulfilled. In that case, a stationary solution may still
exist in which the ansatz of a vanishing probability current
Jx=0 is not valid although the divergence of Jx remains
zero, Jx=0. In these cases the stationary distribution has
to be derived by different means.
A particularly simple case where these problems do not
arise is d=2, where only two types A and B are present. The
state of the system can be described by the fraction x of A
individuals. The remaining fraction 1−x consists of B indi-
viduals. Assuming a mutation rate u from A to B as well as
from B to A, the transition probabilities read
TBAx =
xAx1 − u + 1 − xBxu

1 − x ,
TABx =
xAxu + 1 − xBx1 − u

x . 12
The drift and diffusion terms in the Fokker-Planck equation
become
ax = x1 − x
Ax − Bx

+ u
1 − xBx − xAx

13
bx =
1
N
x1 − x
Ax + Bx

+
u
N
xAx + x − 1Bx

2x − 1 . 14
The stationary solution of Eq. 3 can now be computed as
outlined above and is given by
*x = N exp
0
x

ydy	 , 15
where 
y=b−1y2ay−by, by= ddy by, and
N=01 exp0x
ydydx. In general, the derivation of a sta-
tionary distribution of strategies under the effect of mutations
cannot be solved analytically. Earlier approaches have ap-
proximated such distributions either by assuming weak mu-
tations 33, where only transition probabilities between ab-
sorbing states have to be considered, or by neglecting all
mutations except those in the absorbing states 34. The dis-
tribution given by Eq. 15 for large N is valid for arbitrary
selection intensity w, mutation rate u, and any payoff matrix.
A. Neutral dynamics
In the frequency-dependent Moran process, often weak
selection w1 is considered 13,25. For weak selection, the
interactions are only corrections to a background of neutral
dynamics 4,35. Therefore, we first discuss the stationary
distribution for w=0, where the game has no influence on the
fitness. In this case, x is a gradient, which is equivalent to
the assumption that the probability current vanishes every-
where, and the stationary distribution can be computed di-
rectly from Eq. 11. For d=2, we find for the drift term
ax=u1−2x and for the diffusion term bx= u2x−12
+2x1−x /N. Both results are valid for the case in which
the mutation rates from A to B and vice versa are u. Hence,

x is given by

x = − 2
u2 + N − 12x − 1
u2x − 12 + 2x1 − x
. 16

x vanishes for the critical mutation rate uc=1/ 2+N. For
uuc, 
x has a minimum at x=1/2. Accordingly, the sta-
tionary probability distribution has maxima at the boundaries
when only few mutations per generation occur. On the other
hand, for uuc there is a maximum at x=1/2. Mutations
lead the system away from the states x=0 and x=1 and the
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distribution is centered around the middle where both strat-
egies have equal frequencies, see Fig. 1. For u=uc we have

x=0 and hence Eq. 15 predicts a uniform distribution.
However, simulations show a distribution that decays
slightly toward the boundaries for small N cf. Fig. 1.
Strictly speaking, a uniform distribution is observed only in
the limit N→.
Critical mutation rates can also be computed for general d
in the case of symmetric mutations in which the mutation
rate between two different states is u, i.e., qlj =u+lj1−du.
All elements of x vanish for u=uc=1/ d+N, because
2ajx=k=1
d−1 
xk
bjkx. Hence, a uniform distribution is ex-
pected for u=uc in the limit of N→. For smaller mutation
rate uuc, the distribution has maxima at the corners of the
simplex where only one strategy is present. For larger
uuc, the distribution has one maximum in the interior of
the simplex. Figure 2 illustrates these two different cases for
neutral selection with three different types, d=3.
B. Frequency-dependent selection
For w0, interactions lead to frequency-dependent tran-
sition probabilities and to corrections of the stationary distri-
bution. Depending on the nature of the game and the strength
of selection, significant differences from neutral evolution
are possible.
As examples, we consider two generic cases of 22
games, the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Snowdrift game. In
the Prisoner’s Dilemma 36,37, two players choose simulta-
neously whether to cooperate or to defect. The cost of coop-
eration is c, while the benefit from cooperation is b. The
interaction of a cooperator with a defector leads to a payoff
of −c for the cooperator and b for the defector. When two
cooperators interact, they both get the payoff b−c, whereas
the interaction of two defectors leads to a payoff of 0. Thus,
irrespective of the other player’s move, it is always better to
defect. However, the reward for mutual cooperation would
be the mutually preferred outcome and hence the dilemma.
The game is described by the payoff matrix
M = m11 m12
m21 m22
 = b − c − cb 0  . 17
The fitness is now a linear combination of the background
fitness and the average payoff from interactions. For coop-
erators, the fitness becomes C=1−w+wb−ci−1−cN
− i /N, whereas defectors have fitness D=1−w+wbi /N.
Since the fitness of defectors is always higher than the fitness
of cooperators DC, any individual is better off not co-
operating, despite the fact that mutual cooperation leads to a
higher average payoff. Without mutations the majority of
stochastic trajectories would therefore end up in the absorb-
ing state with 100% defectors and only few trajectories end
up in pure cooperation. For uuc=1/ N+2, the stationary
distribution keeps a maximum at x=0, but also a second
smaller maximum at the other absorbing state x=1, see Fig.
3. For uuc, mutations drive the system away from these
states and a maximum appears for intermediate values of x.
The position of this maximum is determined by the intensity
of selection w and the payoff matrix. For increasing N, the
situation may change from uuc to uuc. Therefore, the
stochastic effects arising from the finite population size are
clearly visible for small N, whereas large N resembles a sta-
FIG. 1. For neutral selection w=0, three different
scenarios occur for the stationary distribution of the system: For
uuc=1/ 2+N, the system spends most of the time near the ab-
sorbing states, leading to maxima of the stationary distribution at
i=0 and i=N, as shown for u=0.005. For u=uc0.01, the prob-
ability to leave the absorbing states due to mutations and the prob-
ability to reach them by random drift are approximately equal, lead-
ing to a uniform distribution. For uuc, there is on average more
than one mutation per generation and the stationary distribution is
centered around i=N /2. In all three cases, numerical simulations of
the stationary distribution depicted by symbols agree very well with
the theoretical result Eq. 15 shown as lines simulations are aver-
ages over 108 time steps, N=100.
FIG. 2. Color online For d=3 strategies and neutral selection
w=0, the stationary distribution in the strategy space spanned by
the simplex S3 is shown encoded by a color scale, where bright
colors indicate high values. a For mutation rates higher than the
critical mutation rate uc=1/ 3+N, mutations drive the system
away from the absorbing states at the corners of the simplex. Due to
the symmetry of the system, the stationary distribution has a maxi-
mum centered in the middle of the simplex where x=y=z. b If the
mutation rates are smaller than the critical mutation rate uc, the
system spends considerable time in the absorbing states at the cor-
ners. Occasionally, the edges are reached by mutations. However,
since the system typically reaches the corners again before the next
mutation occurs, the stationary probability density in the interior is
very small. In both cases, the simulations of the stationary probabil-
ity distribution shown here averages over 108 time steps do not
deviate significantly from the analytical result Eq. 11: For
u=0.05 the maximal deviation is 2% and for u=0.005 it is 6%
population size N=60.
TRAULSEN, CLAUSSEN, AND HAUERT PHYSICAL REVIEW E 74, 011901 2006
011901-4
tionary distribution that is similar to the one expected from
the deterministic replicator-mutator equation, see Sec. V.
As a second example, we consider the Snowdrift game
38 also known as “Hawk-Dove game” or “Chicken.” In this
game, two players again choose between cooperation and
defection. While the payoffs for defectors are as in the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma, cooperation becomes more favorable: The
payoff of a cooperator against a defector is now b−c and
therefore higher than the payoff of a defector against a de-
fector. On the other hand, it is still lower than the payoff for
mutual cooperation b−c /2. The payoff matrix is given by
M = m11 m12
m21 m22
 = b − c2 b − cb 0  . 18
Again, the payoff is a linear combination of the background
fitness and the average payoff from interactions. In the
Snowdrift game, rare strategies are always favored, resulting
in a drift away from the absorbing states x=0 and x=1. In-
stead, the distribution is centered around a stable equilibrium
in the interior. With decreasing intensity of selection, the
distribution around this equilibrium becomes wider. In the
limit N→ and without mutations u=0, the distribution
narrows and converges to x*=2b−c / 2b−c, the only
stable fixed point of the replicator dynamics. Finite size fluc-
tuations lead to a distribution around this deterministic fixed
point while mutations move the maximum of this distribu-
tion toward x=0.5. As for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, simula-
tions of the stationary distribution agree well with the ana-
lytical result Eq. 15, cf. Fig. 4.
V. REPLICATOR-MUTATOR EQUATION
In the limit of infinite population size, our framework
establishes a natural connection to the traditional determin-
istic description of coevolutionary dynamics. The determin-
istic nature of this limit arises from the fact that the diffusion
matrix bkjx and thus the finite size fluctuations vanish with
1/N as N→. Hence, the Langevin equation becomes de-
terministic and the dynamics is given by the drift term
x˙k=k=1
d Tjk−Tkj. Since the mutation rate per individual is
fixed, the effect of mutations prevails in the limit of N→.
In this case, Eq. 6 incorporating mutation and selection can
be written as
x˙k =
1


j=1
d
xj jxqjk − xk. 19
This is the replicator-mutator equation corresponding to the
adjusted replicator dynamics 7. So far, replicator-mutator
equations 11,12 have not been derived from a microscopic
birth-death process. They are the natural extension of the
deterministic replicator equation 9,10 that take into account
mutations between strategies. Without mutations qjk= jk,
types that have a fitness above the average fitness in the
population increase in abundance, while types with a fitness
below average decrease in abundance. Mutations interfere
with this selection dynamics: Only types that have a fitness
above the average and that have a sufficiently small mutation
FIG. 3. Stationary distribution of strategies in a Prisoner’s Di-
lemma under the influence of mutations and selection in a finite
population. The distribution undergoes a qualitative change with
increasing population size. Main figure: For N=50, the stationary
distribution for w=0.2 has a maximum at the Nash equilibrium
x=0, where only defectors are present, as u is below the critical
mutation rate uc=0.02. When selection is weak, it resembles the
result from neutral selection w=0.01. Inset: When the population
size is increased to N=10 000, the mutation rate is above the critical
value uc10−4 and the situation resembles the result expected from
the deterministic description of the replicator-mutator equation: The
stationary distribution has a maximum at x*0.14 for w=0.2,
which is the stable fixed point of the replicator-mutator equation.
For weak selection w=0.01, the stable fixed point is located at
x*0.47 and the distribution around this fixed point is wider due to
stronger fluctuations. In all cases, numerical simulations of the
frequency-dependent Moran process symbols agree well with the
analytical solution Eq. 15 for the stationary distribution depicted
by lines b=1, c=0.25, mutation rate u=0.01, average over 108
time steps.
FIG. 4. The Snowdrift game exhibits a stable interior equilib-
rium and typically, coexistence of the two different types is ob-
served. Only for small mutation rates and weak selection, the ab-
sorbing states are reached. Therefore, the stationary distribution has
a maximum in the interior. For weak selection w=0.01 this maxi-
mum is close to x=0.5. With stronger selection, the maximum
moves toward the mixed equilibrium at x*0.856. Numerical
simulations symbols are in good agreement with the theoretical
result depicted by full lines b=1, c=0.25, mutation rate u=0.01,
averages over 108 time steps, N=200.
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rate increase in frequency. Hence, the stable fixed points of
the system represent a balance between selection dynamics
and mutation dynamics.
VI. LOCAL UPDATE PROCESS
So far, we have only considered the frequency-dependent
Moran process. However, our framework can also be applied
to other coevolutionary processes. As an example, we gener-
alize the local update process 29 to an arbitrary number of
strategies. In the local update process, an individual 1 is
chosen at random and compares its payoff to another ran-
domly chosen individual 2. With probability
p =
1
2
+
w
2
2 − 1

20
1 adapts the strategy of 2 where the constant  is the
maximal possible payoff difference and w denotes the inten-
sity of selection 39. For d different types, the transition
probabilities are given by
Tkjx = xkxj12 + w2  jx − kx  . 21
From the transition probabilities, we can calculate the drift
term akx=w /xkkx−, which is independent of N.
The diffusion term is independent of the payoffs and simpli-
fies to bjkx=xj jk−xk /N. Thus, up to a constant rescaling
of time, we recover the standard replicator dynamics for d
types in the limit N→,
x˙k = xkkx −  . 22
Up to a dynamical rescaling of time, Eq. 22 is identical to
Eq. 19 without mutations. The natural extension of Eq. 22
that includes mutations while retaining the time scale is the
standard replicator-mutator equation 12
x˙k = 
j=1
d
xj jxqjk − xk = 
j,l=1
d
xj jxxlqjk − xkqkl .
23
For general qjk, it is not possible to define a microscopic
process in which the transition probabilities only depend on
payoff differences that leads to this differential equation.
Only for the special case of vanishing mutations qjk= jk, this
is possible.
A microscopic mechanism involving spontaneous muta-
tions has been proposed in Ref. 40. This yields the transi-
tion rates 41
Tkjx = xkxj12 + w2  jx − kx  + xkqkj . 24
As shown in Ref. 40, the limit N→ results in the differ-
ential equation
x˙k =
w

xkkx −  + 
j=1
d
xjqjk − xkqkj . 25
This selection mutation equation reduces to the standard rep-
licator dynamics for qjk= jk 10,42. It describes selection
under the influence of spontanteous mutations. Such sponta-
neous mutations can also be incorporated into other coevo-
lutionary processes, leading to the same additive mutation
term  j=1
d xjqjk−xkqkj.
VII. DISCUSSION
Traditional descriptions of coevolutionary systems rely on
the assumption that populations are sufficiently large such
that they can safely be considered infinite. In this case, acci-
dental fixation of types with low fitness is not possible. For
the more realistic case of finite populations, only a few ana-
lytical methods exist that are often restricted to two types.
Hence, these systems often rely on simulations which are
very illuminative for special cases, but give little insight into
the general dynamics of these systems. Here, we have shown
how to extend the replicator dynamics in order to account for
fluctuations arising from finite population sizes for any num-
ber of strategies and arbitrary mutation rates. When allowing
for mutations, homogeneous states in which only one type is
present are no longer absorbing boundaries and, instead, the
system converges to a stationary distribution. This stationary
distribution is derived using standard methods from statisti-
cal physics and depends on the population size, the mutation
rate, and the interaction parameters, i.e., the game. The fluc-
tuation term allows for the calculation of corrections to the
replicator dynamics for finite populations and is an important
step in comparing individual based coevolutionary systems
with deterministic dynamics. Mutations are not a source of
fluctuations, but provide a mechanism that leads to a mixing
of different types. However, fluctuations do not arise solely
from finite populations. Instead, there are additional sources
of noise that might have to be incorporated in other ways,
such as noise from heterogeneity of agents or external noise
that can influence interactions.
Our approach can be applied to any number of strategies
d, but is based on the assumption that the population size is
sufficiently large such that population densities can be ap-
proximated by smooth functions. In high-dimensional
spaces, such a continuum description may not always be
appropriate 43.
Starting from microscopic descriptions for individual
based coevolutionary processes with an arbitrary number of
strategies, we have derived a replicator-mutator equation
with additional first-order corrections that describe stochastic
effects arising from finite populations.
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APPENDIX: DERIVATION OF THE FOKKER-PLANCK
EQUATION FOR AN ARBITRARY NUMBER OF
STRATEGIC TYPES
For d strategies, the Master equation describing the
change of the probability Pi1 , . . . , id that the system is in
focal state i1 , . . . , id is given by
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P+i1, . . . ,id = Pi1, . . . ,id
+ 
j,k=1
d
Pi1, . . . ,ij − 1, . . . ,ik + 1, . . . ,id
Tkji1, . . . ,ij − 1, . . . ,ik + 1, . . . ,id
− 
j,k=1
d
Pi1, . . . ,idTkji1, . . . ,id . A1
The first term is the probability that during a short time in-
terval  the state remains unchanged, the second term is the
influx from other states, and the third term is the outflux to
other states. The probability Tkji1 , . . . , id that one individual
of type k is replaced by another individual of type j does not
have to be specified. Special cases are given by Eqs. 2 and
24. Next, we introduce the notation xl= il /N and t= /N and
the probability density x ; t=NPtx. For simplicity, we
use the abbreviation j− ,k+= x1 , . . . ,xj −1/N , . . . ,xk
+1/N , . . . ,xd for states neighboring the focal state
x= i1 , . . . , id /N and obtain
x;t + t − x;t
Nt
= 
j,k=1
d
j−,k+;tTkjj−,k+
− 
j,k=1
d
x;tTkjx . A2
For N1, the left hand side can be approximated by
˙x ; t /N. In order to expand the right hand side of Eq. A2
for N1, we rewrite the first term as

j,k=1
d
j−,k+;tTkjj−,k+
= 
j,k=1
d
j−,k+;tTkjj−,k+ + j+,k−;tTjkj+,k−
2
.
A3
The expansion of the probability density at a state j± ,k at
time t can be written as
j±,k;t  x;t ± 1
N x;txj − x;txk 	
+
1
2N2 2x;txj2 − 2
2x;t
xjxk
+
2x;t
xk
2 	
A4
and similarly for the transition probabilities
Tkjj±,k  Tkjx ±
1
N Tkjxxj − Tkjxxk 	
+
1
2N2 2Tkjxxj2 − 2
2Tkjx
xjxk
+
2Tkjx
xk
2 	 .
A5
Let us consider the terms on the right-hand side of Eq. A2
depending on their order in 1/N. Obviously, the terms that
are independent of N cancel. Up to 1/N, we find
1
2N j,k=1
d x;t Tkjx
xk
−
Tkjx
xj

+ x;t Tjkx
xj
−
Tjkx
xk

+ Tkjx x;txk − x;txj 
+ Tjkx x;txj − x;txk 	
= −
1
Nk=1
d

xk

j=1
d
x;tTjkx − Tkjx . A6
Since 1/N appearing on both sides of Eq. A2 cancels, this
determines the drift term that is independent of N. All other
terms vanish for N→. The first correction for finite popu-
lation sizes is the diffusion term resulting from terms in the
expansion of the right-hand side of Eq. A2 that are of order
1 /N2. For these terms, we find
1
2N2 j,k=1
d Tkjx + Tjkx2  2xj2 − 2 
2
xjxk
+
2
xk
2x;t
+ x;t 2
xj
2 − 2
2
xjxk
+
2
xk
2Tkjx + Tjkx2
+
x;t
xk
Tkjx
xk
−
x;t
xk
Tkjx
xj
−
x;t
xj
Tkjx
xk
+
x;t
xj
Tkjx
xj
+
x;t
xk
Tjkx
xk
−
x;t
xk
Tjkx
xj
−
x;t
xj
Tjkx
xk
+
x;t
xj
Tjkx
xj
	
=
1
2N2 k,j=1
d  2
xk
2 −
2
xjxk
x;tTkjx + Tjkx	 .
A7
So far, we have not used the normalization condition,
 j=1
d xj =1. Since xd is fully determined by xj with 1 jd,
we eliminate the dependence on xd in the transition prob-
abilities Tjk and in the probability density . Hence, all de-
rivatives with respect to xd vanish. Applying this and com-
bining Eqs. A6 and A7 with the expansion of the left-
hand side of Eq. A2, we obtain the Fokker-Planck equation
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˙x = − 
k=1
d−1

xk
xakx +
1
2 j,k=1
d−1
2
xkxj
xbjkx
A8
with drift vector
akx = 
j=1
d
Tjkx − Tkjx A9
and a diffusion matrix bjl defined as
bjkx =
1
N− Tjkx − Tkjx +  jkl=1
d
Tjlx + Tljx	 ,
A10
which is symmetric, bjkx=bkjx. Note that the drift
vector of a system with d strategies has d−1 components,
k=1, . . . ,d−1 and that the diffusion matrix is of dimension
d−1.
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